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IT IS OFTEN SAID that the rise in the value of the U.S. dollar since 1980 
has played an important  role in slowing  the inflation  rate, and there  is a 
corresponding  concern  that  a sharp  drop  in the currently  high  U. S. dollar 
exchange rate will have a serious inflationary  effect. A casual look at 
recent experience with exchange rate and price movements  lends cre- 
dence to this concern. Table 1 shows that for every year since 1975,  a 
depreciation  of the dollar has always been accompanied  by a higher 
inflation  rate; and an exchange rate appreciation  invariably  has been 
linked  with a lower inflation  rate.  1  This  paper  evaluates  whether  changes 
in the exchange  rate actually  have important  effects on the price  level.2 
Exchange rate movements are thought  to affect the domestic price 
level mainly  through  the prices of imports:  exchange rate appreciation 
makes imports cheaper; this in turn retards  increases in the prices of 
domestic  goods through  cheaper  imported  inputs  and through  competi- 
tion from cheaper  finished  imported  goods. The import  deflator,  shown 
in figure  1, has fallen steadily  for the last three  years, a period  when U.S. 
inflation  was slowing. The import  deflator  for that period is flat when 
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table  1, the extent, and  in some years even the direction,  of the exchange  rate  movement 
depends  on the index  used, an issue which  will be addressed  later  in the paper. 
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Table  1. Prices  and Exchange  Rates, 1971-83a 
Annual  changes  in percent 
Federal  Morgan 
Reserve  Guaranty  Import-share 
Consumer  exchange  exchange  exchange 
Year  price index  rate indexb  rate indexc  rate indexc 
1971  4.3  -2.7  -2.8  -3.0 
1972  3.3  -7.4  -6.7  -6.2 
1973  6.2  -9.2  -6.9  -5.5 
1974  11.0  2.3  1.7  1.6 
1975  9.1  -2.9  0.1  0.7 
1976  5.8  7.2  3.6  2.4 
1977  6.5  -2.2  -0.1  0.1 
1978  7.7  -  10.6  - 8.2  -6.7 
1979  11.3  -4.7  -  1.5  -0.4 
1980  13.5  -0.8  -0.1  0.0 
1981  10.4  17.7  9.8  8.0 
1982  6.1  13.3  10.3  9.0 
1983  3.2  7.5  4.0  2.5 
Source: Consumer  price index, U.S. Bureau  of Labor Statistics.  The Federal  Reserve and Morgan  Guaranty 
exchange  rate  indexes,  various  issues  of Federal Reserve Bulletin and  World  Financial Markets, respectively.  Import- 
share  exchange  rate  index, author's  calculation. 
a. The rates  of change  are calculated  from  the average  value  of the variable  in the year.  The  exchange  rate  indexes 
are constructed  so that  a positive  sign indicates  appreciation  of the dollar  with respect  to a basket  of currencies. 
b. Constructed  from  the bilateral  exchange  rates  of the United  States  with  ten major  industrial  countries  and  using 
as weights  their  respective  shares  of global  trade  during  1972-76.  Trade  is defined  as imports  plus exports. 
c. Constructed  from  fifteen  currencies  whose weights  are  the 1980  bilateral  shares  of these countries  in U.S. trade 
in manufacturing. 
d. Constructed  with the same group  of countries  used in the Federal  Reserve  index but using  as weights  these 
countries'  bilateral  shares  of total imports  of the United  States  during  1972-76. 
one excludes services, petroleum,  and  food-three  categories  of imports 
whose prices  vary  widely  for  reasons  that  are  unrelated  to national  costs. 
The confluence in the movements of the exchange rate, import  prices, 
and the domestic price level certainly gives the impression that the 
external sector in the past few years has been an important  factor in 
explaining  U.S. inflation. 
If the preceding interpretation  is  correct, then we  may now be 
confronting  an important  new source of external disturbance  besides 
prices of oil and primary  commodities. In the future, will changes in 
foreign  demand,  operating  via exchange  rate  movements,  rival  domestic 
demand and wage developments as causes of U.S.  inflation? Will 
speculative  capital  flows  be the external  shock  of the 1980s?  To anticipate 
the empirical  results, I argue that the preceding  interpretation  of the 
current  inflation  slowdown exaggerates  the international  influence.  For Wing T. Woo  513 
Figure 1. Implicit Import Deflators, 1971  -1984 
Index. 1972 =  100 
Source:  National  income  and product  accounts. 
the United States, exchange rate movements  have a significant  though 
far from proportional  effect on nonfood, nonfuel merchandise  import 
prices; but, surprisingly,  these prices in turn  have little or no effect on 
the consumption  deflator  that  excludes food and  energy. 
Except  for the simple  doctrine  of purchasing-power  parity,  which  has 
been unable  to explain most of the variation  in exchange rates that has 
occurred since 1973, theory predicts no overall correlation  between 
exchange  rate  movements  and  price  level movements.  The  fact that  such 
a correlation  was not observed before 1975  underscores  the point that 
the analysis  of this relationship  is not straightforward.  A foreign  mone- 
tary  expansion  that increases the demand  for U.S. exports will tend to 
raise the U.S. price level while appreciating  the dollar. On the other 514  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1984 
hand, a U.S. monetary  expansion will raise the U.S. price level while 
depreciating  the dollar.  Not only does the sign  of the correlation  depend 
on the nature  of the disturbance;  it also depends  on the structure  of the 
economy. Whether  an expansionary  fiscal policy appreciates  or depre- 
ciates the exchange rate depends on the response of capital flows to 
interest rate changes. The greater the response, the more likely the 
exchange rate will appreciate,  as demonstrated  in the recent U.S. and 
French  fiscal expansions: the U.S. expansion  was accompanied  by an 
appreciation  of the U.S.  exchange rate, while a depreciation  of the 
French  exchange  rate  accompanied  the French  expansion. 
The key point is that there is no unambiguous  relationship  between 
the  exchange  rate  and  the  price  level. To  put  the statement  more  formally, 
a reduced-form  relationship  does not exist for these two endogenous 
variables. It does not follow, however, that the widespread concern 
about the inflationary  effect of an exchange rate depreciation  is un- 
founded.  The next section makes this issue a well-defined  question  and 
shows that the answer to it has important  implications  for the level of 
employment  and prices. The paper  then turns  to empirical  evidence on 
the effects of exchange rates and discusses the implications of the 
empirical  results  for economic performance. 
Defining the Question 
There  are at least four  channels  through  which the exchange  rate  can 
affect  the price  level. The first  is the prices  of imported  consumer  goods, 
which  directly  affect the consumer  price index. The second is the prices 
of imported  inputs,  which directly  affect costs of production.  An impor- 
tant question  concerning  these first  two channels  is whether  the foreign 
prices of the imports are given and hence whether an exchange rate 
movement  passes entirely  onto the U.S. price of the imports.  The third 
is aggregate  demand  via the trade  multiplier;  exchange  rate movements 
change the current account position, which in turn affects aggregate 
demand. 
The fourth  is foreign  prices, which affect the prices of domestically 
produced  competing  goods. The effect through  this channel  is difficult 
to model because it involves price-setting  behavior in sectors of the 
economy characterized  by imperfect competition. If this channel is 
effective, the price of U.S.  exports ought to depend on the price of Wing T. Woo  5i5 
competing  goods in foreign markets,  and the price of U.S. goods that 
compete with imports should be affected by the dollar price of these 
imports.  These actions  in the domestic  tradable  goods sector  hence tend 
to raise the U.S. price level when the exchange  rate depreciates  and to 
lower it when the exchange  rate  appreciates. 
The importance  of these foreign  price effects depends, among  other 
things, on the size of U.S. supply and demand  in the world market.  If 
the U.S. market  is small, foreign  prices are fixed in foreign  currencies. 
At the opposite extreme, if the U.S. market  is very large,  then  the dollar 
prices of tradable  goods may be largely independent  of exchange rate 
movements, because both U.S. and foreign  firms  will price to the U.S. 
market.  But relative  market  size is only one of the factors  that  cloud  the 
relationship  between the exchange rate and prices of tradable  goods. 
Strategic  considerations  and institutional  factors are also important  in 
oligopolistic situations. Those who export goods to the United States 
may  be sufficiently  influenced  by U. S. objections  to steel and  automobile 
imports  that they would not expand their market  shares rapidly  when 
the dollar appreciates sharply  but instead would choose higher  profit 
margins  by maintaining  their  prices in dollars.  Also, firms  are  less likely 
to change  domestic  prices  when  a change  in  the  exchange  rate  is perceived 
to be temporary.  Given all these possibilities, the impact  of exchange 
rate  movements  on the U.S. price  level must  be determined  empirically. 
Although  a reduced-form  relationship  between  the exchange  rate  and 
the price  level cannot  be derived,  a structural  relationship  between  them 
can be specified based on the channels of influence  described above. 
This structural  relationship  presumes  that  pricing  behavior  for a sizable 
portion  of the economy can  be characterized  by some version  of markup 
over  unit  costs  .3 Such  a cost-markup  model  is inappropriate  when  applied 
either  to sectors  with  perfect  competition  or  to sectors  that  are  effectively 
cartelized.  A good example  of the former  is the market  for homogeneous 
agricultural  products,  for which climatic  conditions  can be more  impor- 
tant  than  labor  costs in determining  prices. If the U.S. market  is only a 
small  part of the global market,  it may be appropriate  to think  of these 
3. Motivation  of such a relationship  is given  in William  Nordhaus,  "Recent  Develop- 
ments  in  Price  Dynamics,  " in  Otto  Eckstein,  ed., The  Econometrics  ofPrice  Determination 
(Washington,  D.C.: Federal  Reserve  Board,  1970),  pp. 16-49, and  Robert  J. Gordon,  "The 
Impact  of Aggregate  Demand  on Prices," BPEA,  3:1975,  pp. 613-62. The exact specifi- 
cation  depends  on assumptions  regarding  the nature  of the demand  curve  and  the type of 
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products  as having  a world  price  fixed in terms  of a basket  of currencies 
and of each country as being a price taker. Then the degree to which 
exchange  rate changes are passed through  should  be larger  for agricul- 
tural  products  than  for manufactured  goods. 
A structural  relationship  between  prices  and  the exchange  rate  is also 
unlikely  to hold  when a cartel  sets the price  of the commodity.  The costs 
of organizing  and maintaining  discipline  within  a cartel  may be lower if 
the price is set in a particular  currency.  A good case can be made that, 
so far, OPEC has been setting the price of oil in U.S. dollars  and has 
been unresponsive to subsequent changes in the exchange rate. At a 
minimum,  OPEC's  pricing  policy cannot  be characterized  as a continu- 
ous reaction to the dollar exchange rate; therefore, I assume that the 
price of imported oil is given exogenously.4 Furthermore,  given the 
substitution  possible between different  sources of energy, the price of 
energy in general  is not taken to reflect  unit labor  cost to an important 
degree. 
Because of these considerations,  I apply the cost-markup  model to 
prices of imported  and exported  goods excluding  prices of agricultural 
products  and  energy  and explain  the deflator  for consumption  excluding 
food and  energy.S  I use the  price  of imported  petroleum  as an  explanatory 
variable  for the consumption  deflator  in order  to take into account the 
impact  of oil prices as an input  to other  finished  goods prices. 
To examine the effect of the exchange rate on import and export 
prices separately  from  the effect of these prices on the U.S. price level, 
I estimate  empirically  three  types of equations: 
(1)  Pm  OtO  +  alC  +  t2e+  Ol3Cf, 
(2)  PX=  PO+ PIc+  12e+  33Cf, 
(3)  p  =  YO  +  YWIW  +  Y2Pm  +  'Y3Px  +  Y4Poilb 
4. A survey  of our  ignorance  concerning  OPEC's  pricing  policy  is Dermot  Gately,  "A 
Ten-Year Retrospective: OPEC and the World Oil Market," Journal of Economic 
Literature,  vol. 23 (September  1984),  pp. 1100-14. Gately may share my opinion  that 
exchange  rate  movements  have  no predictable  impact  on OPEC  pricing  behavior,  because 
the exchange  rate  is not mentioned  anywhere  in his survey. It is interesting  that  both  the 
1973-74 quadrupling  and the 1979-80 doubling  of the price of oil were preceded by 
substantial  dollar  depreciations. 
5. The analysis is restricted  to merchandise  trade because the bulk of services is 
remittance  of dividends  and  interest  payments. Wing T. Woo  517 
where all variables  are expressed as natural  logarithms  and are defined 
as follows: 
p  =  consumption  deflator  excluding  food and  energy, 
Pm  =  domestic  price of imported  goods excluding  food and energy, 
PX  =  domestic  price of goods competing  in foreign  markets 
excluding  agricultural  products, 
p.ij =  price of imported oil, 
e  =  U.S.  exchangerate, 
c =  normal  unit  labor  costs in manufacturing, 
Cf =  foreign  c, 
w =  wages in private  nonfarm  economy. 
In addition,  I estimate  directly  the effects onp of the determinants  of pm 
and  px  through  an equation  of the form 
(4)  P  =  8o +  51w +  83Cf  +  83e  +  84poil. 
Four proxies for the demand variable  (capacity utilization  rate in the 
manufacturing  sector, the Perry-weighted  unemployment  rate, the ratio 
of unfilled  orders  in manufacturing  industries  to gross national  product, 
and the ratio of new orders in manufacturing  to GNP) were tried in all 
the above equations, but they never entered significantly  and were 
dropped. 
Equations 3 and 4 focus on the price effects of an exchange rate 
movement when policies stabilize aggregate demand. The effect of 
demand,  which does not enter  directly  in the equations,  appears  in other 
variables  such as labor  costs. To be specific,  equations  3 and  4 allow one 
to answer  the following  question,  which  underlies  today's  concern  about 
the fall of the dollar exchange rate: if a shift in portfolio preferences 
away from dollar-denominated  assets depreciates  the dollar, and fiscal 
and monetary  policies offset all changes in aggregate  demand,  what is 
the impact on the price level? The more general  question of the price 
effects of a shift away from dollar-denominated  assets when policy 
instrument  settings  are  kept  fixed  cannot  be answered  without  reference 
to a full econometric  model. The partial  equilibrium  approach  focuses 
exclusively on the price effects of exchange rate movements without 
having  to consider  the cause of the change  in the exchange  rate. 518  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1984 
The Evidence 
Several  issues arise when one empirically  tests equations  1-4. Table 
1  shows  that  the dollar  has appreciated  by significantly  different  amounts 
when  measured  by the exchange  rate  index  weighted  by bilateral  import 
share instead of by the Federal Reserve index, which is weighted by 
multilateral  trade share. The appropriate  choice of exchange  rate index 
depends  on one's model of price  interactions  and  on the question  that  is 
being asked. For explaining export prices and the influence on the 
domestic price level  of overall trade through competition in every 
national  market, the Federal Reserve's multilateral-weight  index may 
be the best. On  the other  hand,  if the price  of imports  is the main  channel 
affecting  domestic inflation,  then the bilateral  import-share  index may 
be the most suitable  indicator.  These considerations  suggest  the use of 
the multilateral  exchange rate index for the export price equation  and 
the bilateral import-share  exchange rate index for the import price 
equation. However, because previous studies have generally  focused 
on the multilateral-weight  index, it is used as an alternative in all 
equations  to provide  comparability  with other  results. 
The  choice of time  period  is important  for  empirical  study  of exchange 
rate effects. A major change of regime occurred in 1973:1  when the 
Bretton Woods system of adjustable  pegs was replaced by floating 
exchange  rates. This may have altered  the responsiveness  of domestic 
prices  to exchange  rates. Furthermore,  price  and  wage controls  affected 
price and wage behavior  from 1971:1  to 1975:  1.6 For these reasons, the 
relations  considered  here are estimated  over the period  from 1975:2  to 
the present. 
The fixed-weight  consumption  deflator  is explained, instead of the 
consumerprice  index,7 because  the  latter  treated  housing  inappropriately 
6. Perry  omitted  the data  from  this period  in his study  on wage  behavior,  and  Gordon 
used complicated  dummies  to control  for the distortion.  See George  L. Perry,  "Inflation 
in Theory and Practice," BPEA, 1:1980,  pp. 207-41, and Robert  J. Gordon, "Output 
Fluctuations  and Gradual  Price Adjustment,"  Journal  of Economic  Literature,  vol. 19 
(June  1981),  pp. 493-530. 
7. Estimations  using the CPI gave similar  results. In addition,  all estimations  were 
made  with fixed-weight  and implicit  deflators.  The answers  were the same for the two 
deflators  except for table  6, and  there  both  sets of estimation  are  reported. Wing T. Woo  519 
before 1983.  In all the estimations  I use the first-differenced  form  of the 
equations,  because  correct  statistical  testing  under  instrumental  variable 
estimation  requires  that the population  variance  of the right-hand-side 
variables  be finite. 
Because  each equation  uses contemporaneous  endogenous  variables, 
simultaneity  is a significant  issue and has to be addressed.8  To do this 
the  key results  in  each  table  were  reestimated  using  instrumental-variable 
estimation  with unconstrained  lags. This method provides a check on 
the robustness  of the results obtained  from ordinary  least squares  with 
Almon  lags. 
For equations 1 and 2, theory  tells us what the coefficients  should  be 
under  two extreme  cases. At one extreme, where the United States is a 
price taker in the world market,  the foreign unit labor cost coefficient 
would  be 1.0, the exchange  rate  coefficient  would  be -  1.0, and  the U.S. 
unit labor cost coefficient would be insignificantly  different  from zero. 
At the other extreme, where the United States is the price setter, there 
would be a coefficient of 1.0 for U.S.  unit labor cost and zero-value 
coefficients  for the exchange  rate and  foreign  unit  labor  cost. 
The estimation of equation 1 is shown in table 2. The instrumental 
variable  estimations  with the lags unconstrained  yield the same results 
as the ordinary  least squares  estimations  with Almon  lags. Because the 
coefficient estimates from the former  are free of simultaneity  bias, the 
preferred  equations  for explaining  the import  deflator  are 2-6 and  2-8. 
There  are two noteworthy  results  in table  2. The first  is that  domestic 
labor  costs are more important  than foreign  labor  costs in determining 
the prices of foreign imports.  This suggests that foreign  manufacturers 
price  the product  they export  to the U.S. market  according  to U.S. cost 
conditions  rather  than  according  to the costs in their  own countries.  The 
second  finding  is that  the pass-through  of an exchange  rate  movement  is 
less than complete. All the exchange rate coefficients are less than 1.0 
in absolute value, though their sign is  as  expected. Although the 
coefficients associated with the two exchange rate indexes are very 
different,  historically  both indexes attribute  the same amount  of change 
in the import deflator to exchange rate movements. The 43 percent 
8. The simultaneity  problem occurs when any of the right-hand-side  variables  is 
correlated  with  the contemporaneous  error  term.  This  can cause ordinary  least squares  to 
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Table 3.  Fixed-Weight Merchandise Export Deflator Excluding Agricultural Products, 
1975:2-1984:  la 
Independent  variable 
Summary  Federal  .  statistic 
Reserve  Foreign  unit  statistic 
Regres-  U.S. unit  exchange  labor cost  Durbin- 
sion  Constant  labor cost  rate index  (multilateral)  Watson  R2 
Ordinary  least squares estimation  with  Almon lags 
3-1  0.353  1.003  -0.128  -0.051  1.78  0.30 
(0.13)  (2.87)  (-  1.34)  (-0.01) 
3-2  0.334  1.001  -0.128  .  .  .  1.78  0.33 
(0.15)  (3.30)  (-  1.37) 
Instrumental  variable  estimation  with lags unconstrained 
3-3  - 0.436  1.091  -0.142  0.039  1.93  ... 
(-0.13)  (2.37)  (-  1.33)  (0.07) 
3-4  -0.769  1.170  -0.123  ...  1.97  ... 
(-0.25)  (2.67)  (-1.14) 
Source:  Equation 2. Data sources,  same as table 2. 
a.  See  notes  to table 2. 
appreciation  of the Federal Reserve exchange rate index from 1980  to 
1983  accounts for a 17  percent decline in the import  deflator,  while the 
21  percent  appreciation  of the  import-share  exchange  rate  index  accounts 
for a 16  percent  fall in import  prices.9 
The equations  in table  3 for  the pricing  of U. S. nonagricultural  exports 
show that  the exchange  rate  has only a small  estimated  effect. U.S. cost 
conditions  are the most important  factor  determining  export  prices. The 
finding  that competitive  pressures in foreign markets  do not influence 
U.S.  export prices suggests that U.S. firms in general regard  foreign 
demand  as residual  demand. This overall insensitivity  of U.S. export 
prices  to foreign  factors  is in line with  the work  of Artus  and  Lawrence.  10 
The results from the import  price and export price equations  provide 
support  for the usual asymmetrical  practice of specifying U.S. price 
9. Calculated  from  regressions  2-6 and  2-8, respectively. 
10. Jacques  R. Artus, "The  Behavior  of Export  Prices  for  Manufactures,"  in Peter  B. 
Clark,  Dennis  E. Logue, and  Richard  James  Sweeney, eds., The  Effects  ofExchange  Rate 
Adjustments  (U.S.  Department  of the Treasury, 1974), pp. 319-40, and Robert Z. 
Lawrence,  "Toward  a Better Understanding  of Trade  Balance  Trends:  The Cost-Price 
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equations  to include  the import  deflator  but not the export  deflator.  "  I 
The determinants  of the nonfood, nonfuel  consumption  deflator  are 
examined in table 4. The insignificance  of competitive pressure from 
foreign markets  as a factor in U.S. inflation  is borne out in regression 
4-1, where the export deflator  even has the wrong sign; the surprising 
finding,  from regression  4-2, is that the import  deflator  does not affect 
the price level either. These point estimates  imply  that  there  is no direct 
price effect from exchange rates. Regressions  4-4 to 4-7 represent  my 
attempt  to look further  for a direct exchange  rate effect by substituting 
the exchange  rate  and  foreign  unit  labor  cost for the import  deflator.  The 
exchange rate is invariably  insignificant  and has the wrong sign. The 
foreign  unit labor  cost variable  fares even worse, being significant  with 
the wrong sign. Regression 4-3, which eliminates all foreign trade 
variables except the price of imported  oil, is the only specification  in 
which all the coefficients  have the expected signs. 
Note, however, that the t-statistics on import  prices and exchange 
rates in table 4 are generally very low. Table 5 summarizes  the key 
coefficient  estimates  and  the one-standard-error  and  two-standard-error 
confidence  intervals  of those estimates. The table also gives the priors 
for the coefficients under two hypotheses: the first is complete pass- 
through  of the exchange rate to import  prices together with full pass- 
through  of import  prices to U.S. consumer  prices; the second accepts 
the exchange rate elasticity estimated  in table 2 and assumes full pass- 
through  of import  prices to U.S. consumer  prices. It should be noted 
that  hypotheses  that  call  for import  prices  to affect  prices  of domestically 
produced  substitutes  would  attribute  larger  price  effects to import  prices 
than  what we here call full pass-through.  12 
Table 5 shows that in no case is the prior  of full exchange  rate pass- 
11. Franco Modigliani  and Lucas Papademos,  "Targets  for Monetary  Policy in the 
Coming Year," BPEA, 1:1975, pp. 141-63; Rudiger  Dombusch and Paul Krugman, 
"Flexible  Exchange  Rates  in the Short  Run,"  BPEA,  3:1976,  pp. 537-75;  Sung  Y. Kwack, 
"Price Linkages  in an Interdependent  World  Economy:  Price Responses to Exchange 
Rate  and  Activity  Changes,"  in Joel  Popkin,  ed., Analysis  ofInflation:  1965-74  (Ballinger, 
1977),  pp. 447-77;  Erich  Spitaller,  "A Model  of Inflation  and  Its Performance  in the Seven 
Main  Industrial  Countries:  1958-76,"  IMF Staff Papers, vol. 25 (June  1978),  pp. 254-77; 
and Rudiger  Dombusch and Stanley Fischer, "The Open Economy, Implications  for 
Monetary  and  Fiscal Policy," paper  prepared  for  the 1984  conference  on business  cycles, 
National  Bureau  of Economic  Research. 
12. Nonfood, nonfuel imports  during  this period are 5 percent of GNP, and if we 
assume  a complete  pass-through  of import  prices  through  the production  process, then  it 
will also be 5 percent  of total  consumption.  Because nonfood,  nonfuel  consumption  is 71 Wing T. Woo  525 
Table 5.  Error Band of Coefficient Estimates in Table 4 
Point  One-standard-  Two-standard- 
Regression  estimate  error  band  error  band  Prior  Ia  Prior  IIb 
Import  deflator 
4-2  -0.02  -0.09  to  + 0.05  -0.16  to  +0.12  +0.07  ... 
4-8  -0.04  -0.14  to  +0.06  -0.25  to  +0.17  +0.07 
Federal  Reserve exchange  rate index 
4-5  0.02  -0.01  to  +0.04  -0.03  to  +0.07  -0.07  -0.03c 
4-10  0.00  -0.03  to  + 0.03  -  0.06 to  + 0.06  -0.07  - 0.03c 
Import-share  exchange  rate index 
4-7  0.02  -0.04  to + 0.07  -0.09  to + 0.12  -0.07  -0.05d 
4-12  -0.01  -0.07  to + 0.05  -0.14  to +0.12  -0.07  -0.05d 
a. Complete  pass-through  of exchange  rate  and import  prices. 
b. Estimated  pass-through  of exchange  rate  and complete  pass-through  of import  prices. 
c. Product  of 0.07 and  0.4, where  0.4 is the exchange  rate  coefficient  in regression  2-6. 
d. Product  of 0.07 and  0.7, where  0.7 is the exchange  rate  coefficient  in regression  2-8. 
through with full import price pass-through  (prior I) less  than one 
standard  error  away from  the estimated  coefficient.  Under  this hypoth- 
esis, two of the six coefficients  are more  than  two standard  errors  away 
from  the prior.  All coefficients  fall  within  two standard  errors  of the prior 
when the assumption  of full exchange rate  pass-through  is relaxed, but 
note that the relaxation of this assumption  puts only one of the four 
coefficients within the one-standard-error  band. While the evidence 
cannot reject prior II  at the usual significance  level, the evidence does 
not support  this hypothesis with more than 50 percent certainty.  With 
some confidence, we  can conclude that the exchange rate affects 
consumer  prices by no more than the weight of imports  in total con- 
sumption.  This  implies  that,  across  all  goods  in  the  economy,  competitive 
effects on the prices of non-oil import-competing  goods appear  to be 
small  or even zero. 
It  is possible  that  automobiles,  protected  by import  quotas  on  Japanese 
cars, dominate  the effect of import  prices  found  in these regressions.  To 
explore  the importance  of autos and to sharpen  the coefficient  estimate 
on other import  prices, I removed services and automobiles  (old and 
new) from the nonfood, nonfuel consumption  deflator  and automobile 
imports  from the nonfood, nonfuel  import  deflator  used previously;  the 
results  are in table 6. As suspected, autos are important  in the results  of 
table  4, with  the table  6 results  showing  insignificant  but  correctly  signed 
coefficients using the fixed-weight consumption deflator. For some 
percent  of total consumption,  the expected import  price coefficient  in regression  4-2 is 
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reason, the results  are substantially  stronger  using  the implicit  deflator, 
which in principle  is not an appropriate  price index.  '3 Furthermore,  the 
significance  of the import  deflator  varies with the Almon constraint  on 
wage: wage is a fourth-order  polynomial  in regression  6-4 and  a second- 
order polynomial in regression 6-5. The strongest evidence we can 
marshall is that a 10 percent rise in the price of nonfood, nonfuel, 
nonautomobile  imports  will raise the total consumption  deflator  by 0.37 
percentage  point. A 10  percent  fall in the Federal  Reserve  exchange  rate 
index, if it does not affect oil, food, or auto  prices, will increase  the total 
consumption  deflator  by 0.22 percentage  point.  14 
Table  7 illustrates  the role of energy  prices in reconciling  the present 
results  with studies  that  found  large  price  effects from  the exchange  rate. 
In the top half of the table, agricultural  and petroleum  products  are not 
excluded  from  the price indexes. The total merchandise  import  deflator 
is highly significant  and suggests that a 10 percent rise in the import 
deflator  will raise the consumption  deflator  by 1.6 percentage  points. A 
10  percent  depreciation  of the Federal  Reserve exchange  rate  index will 
have a direct  price impact  of 1.0  percentage  point. 
Oil is excluded from the consumption and import deflator in the 
second half of table 7, and in contrast  with table 4, food is left in; in this 
case the import deflator  and the exchange rate become insignificant. 
These results suggest that a major reason for the significance  of the 
import  deflator  in a number  of studies is their inclusion  of the price of 
oil. There  was a correlation  between U. S. exchange  rate  depreciation  in 
the 1970s  and OPEC  actions raising  world  oil prices. But data  from  that 
period  do not provide  a useful  answer  to policy concerns  about  exchange 
rate  depreciation  unless one assumes  that  a similar  correlation  will exist 
in the future. 
Note that  the presence of food in the consumption  deflator  makes  the 
export deflator (which includes agricultural  products) significant  and 
that  the exchange  rates have the right  sign. As noted  previously,  food is 
a homogeneous product traded under competitive conditions; hence 
prices  for food should  be more  responsive  to exchange  rate movements 
13. As noted previously,  table  6 is the only case whose implicit  deflators  give results 
different  from  fixed-weight  deflators. 
14. These figures  are calculated  from regressions  6-4 and 6-6 using the fact that the 
basket  of goods in table  6 is 23 percent  of total  consumption  over this period. *S~  ~  ~  ~~~~~0  OC)  en  :q  :I  t  en 
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than prices for goods that are imperfect substitutes.  I interpret the small 
t-statistics  of the exchange  rates as confirming my argument that food 
prices  ought to be modeled  separately  and that it is wrong to include 
them within a cost-markup equation. 
Conclusion 
The insignificance of the external sector after accounting for the 
traditional  causes of inflation-wage and  oil price-suggests that  pricing 
behavior  in traded  goods largely  reflects U.S. prices rather  than being 
an important  cause of U.S. inflation.  The fact that the exchange rate 
adjustment  shows up in the import  deflator  but  may  not be present  at the 
retail  level indicates  that  the dealers  of foreign  products  are  allowing  the 
quasi rents of their distributorships  to fluctuate with exchange rate 
movements.  Their  great  emphasis  on maintenance  of market  share  may 
be due to some of the following  reasons. 
Overall the evidence from import pricing supports the view that 
foreign manufacturers  price their products according  to U.S. demand 
and  cost conditions  with some adjustment  (approximately  40 percent  by 
the Federal  Reserve index and  70 percent  by the import-share  index)  for 
exchange  rate changes. This outcome  is consistent  with a wide range  of 
hypotheses about pricing  behavior. The United States is such a large 
market  that it effectively sets the world  price. Foreigners  can discrimi- 
nate by price, selling their products dear in countries with high labor 
costs and cheap in countries  with low labor  costs. Foreigners  are afraid 
of provoking  U.S. protectionism  when U.S. competitors  are driven  out 
of the domestic market.  Foreigners  may also be wary of the potentially 
harmful  consequences  of starting  a  price  war  with  their  U. S. competitors. 
The last two considerations may be the reasons that distributors  of 
foreign  goods allow their  profit  margins  to move with the exchange  rate 
in order  to preserve  relative  market  shares. 
However, it is likely that none of the above is the sole explanation. 
We do not expect all markets  in the U.S. nonfood, nonfuel  sector to be 
large  vis-a-vis  the  rest  of the  world,  to have  the same  market  imperfection, 
or to cause foreigners and their distributors  to have the same kind of 
strategic  considerations.  The observed aggregate  phenomenon  may be 
the result  of these disparate  factors operating  in different  markets. 530  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1984 
The best price equation  in table 4 is regression  4-3, and it attributes 
the current  slowdown in the inflation  rate to lower wage demands  and 
lower oil prices.  '5 It is likely that this change  in wage behavior  is more 
the result of the deep recession in 1981-83 than of firms  and workers 
holding  wages down in the face of intense import  competition  brought 
about  by the strong  dollar.  It is hard  to argue  on the one hand  that  import 
prices tend to be set in line with U.S. domestic goods prices, whose 
primary  determinant  is wages as the results here suggest, and on the 
other  hand  that  wages are  highly  sensitive  to import  prices.  16 If domestic 
producers  do not change  their  prices in response to foreign  prices, then 
there is no competitive pressure on workers to decrease their wage 
demands.  The conclusion  is that  the primary  determinants  of inflation  in 
the period of our study are wage demands  and oil prices, and they are 
largely determined, respectively, by aggregate demand policies and 
OPEC  actions. 
This  is not  to say that  the strong  dollar  had  no effects on the  moderation 
of wage demands. The appreciation  of the dollar  did hurt U.S. export 
and import-competing  industries and hence helped to deepen their 
recession. The point is that the main price effects of the strong dollar 
have been indirect ones in the form of weaker demand. It should be 
emphasized  that this paper has not provided  proof that exchange rate 
movements  have no direct  effects on the nonfood,  nonfuel  consumption 
deflator. The evidence does not reject the view that there are direct 
effects and that they could be as large as the weight which nonfood, 
nonfuel imports have in the consumption deflator, though the point 
estimates are much smaller than this. The evidence is definitely not 
consistent with the view that, overall, non-oil import  competition  has 
much greater effects through the prices of import-competing  goods; 
however, this view may be applicable  to other  countries. 
15. I think  that the oil price drop  in 1982-83  was largely  due to weak global  demand 
rather  than  to the strong  dollar. 
16. I am  not claiming  that  there  are  no cases in which  wage  demands  are  dependent  on 
the exchange  rate  but only disputing  the significance  of this dependence  in the aggregate. 
I think  that  the only labor  union  that  seriously  took  the exchange  rate  into  account  in wage 
negotiations  is the United  Automobile  Workers. Comments 
and Discussion 
Peter Hooper: The effect of exchange  rate changes  on domestic  prices 
is an issue that has attracted  considerable  empirical  work over the past 
decade of floating  exchange rates. Much of the work during  the 1970s 
formed  a basis for what  I will call the conventional  view that  there  exists 
a significant  structural  or partial-equilibrium  relationship  running  from 
exchange rates to domestic prices through  changes in import  prices. 
Wing Woo's report raises a serious question about the conventional 
view. His empirical  results suggest that these effects of exchange rate 
changes on domestic prices (through  import  prices) could very well be 
negligible,  and  he concludes that  the appreciation  of the dollar  probably 
has not played an important  role in reducing  U.S. inflation  over the past 
four  years. 
The resolution of this question is of interest to policy analysts, not 
only because the exchange rate represents a potentially important 
channel  through  which  changes  in  domestic  policy  affect  domestic  prices, 
but  currently  in particular,  because  the dollar  appears  to many  observers 
(including  some economists) to have taken on a life of its own or, in 
Robert Shiller's new terminology, to have become quite the "fad" 
among  international  investors. A shift in international  preference  away 
from dollar assets resulting  in a sharp  decline in the dollar  could have 
significantly  different  implications  for the near-term  inflation  outlook, 
depending  upon how Woo's results  are interpreted.  To give you an idea 
of the quantitative  magnitude  involved, a survey  of empirical  estimates 
of this  structural  relationship,  when  plugged  into  macroeconomic  models 
maintained  by the Federal  Reserve  Board  staff, suggests  that  the dollar's 
real  appreciation  from  mid-1980  to date, by itself, will have reduced  the 
average  annual  inflation  rate by I to 2 percentage  points for a period  of 
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about  six years.' Where  one lies within  this I to 2 percentage  point  range 
depends  upon one's assumptions  about  the underlying  stance of mone- 
tary  policy and a number  of other  factors. 
Let me summarize  the essential  features  and  the limitations  of Woo's 
analytical  framework.  He adopts  the fairly  standard  structural  approach 
of estimating  markup  price  equations  for  both  import  prices  and  domestic 
consumer prices. He also includes an export price equation in the 
analysis, although  this had little impact  on the results. The import  price 
equation tests  for the impact of  exchange rates on import prices, 
correcting  for other factors that directly influence  import  prices. And 
the domestic price equation tests for the impact of import prices on 
domestic  prices, correcting  for  other  factors  that  directly  affect  domestic 
prices. The coefficient on import  prices in the latter  equation  captures 
effects that  take  place through  input  costs, domestic  competitive  effects, 
and  the prices  of imported  final  goods that  appear  directly  in  the domestic 
price index. 
The major  limitation  of this analytical  framework  is that it tells only 
part (albeit an important  part)  of the story concerning  the relationship 
between exchange rates and domestic prices. The other structural 
determinants  of domestic and import prices (such as domestic and 
foreign  labor  costs, aggregate  demand  pressure,  and  commodity  prices), 
which are essentially treated exogenously in the analysis, can also be 
significantly  influenced  by the exchange rate. Calculating  the full price 
effect of an exchange  rate  change  requires  plugging  these structural  price 
equations  into a more complete macroeconomic  model that determines 
all of the endogenous  determinants  of prices. Another  limitation  of the 
analysis is that the exchange rate itself is an endogenous  variable.  The 
general-equilibrium  relationship  between that variable and domestic 
prices can vary considerably, depending  upon the exogenous shocks 
ultimately  responsible  for the exchange  rate change  and how the shock 
affects domestic prices through  channels  other than  the exchange  rate. 
In fairness  to the author,  he does recognize  most of these limitations  at 
one point or another  in his paper. 
Despite the limitations, Woo's analysis is important  because it ad- 
dresses two key structural  parameters  within  the more  general  relation- 
1. Peter  Hooper  and  Barbara  Lowrey, "Impact  of the Dollar  Depreciation  on the U.S. 
Price Level: An Analytical  Survey of Empirical  Estimates," Staff Study 103  (Board  of 
Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  System, April  1979). Wing T. Woo  533 
ship  between exchange  rates and  domestic  prices. The stability  of these 
parameters  has significant  implications  for estimates  of the price  effects 
of various exogenous shocks that influence the exchange rate. As in 
previous  studies, Woo finds  that exchange  rates have a significant  (and 
relatively stable) direct effect on import  prices, but he fails to find a 
stable structural  coefficient on import prices in the domestic price 
equation. 
Woo's approach  differs  from  the earlier  work  in that  he excludes  food 
and  oil prices from  the analysis. He argues  that  goods whose prices are 
either determined  in competitive markets  or that are set by cartels do 
not belong  in a framework  that  models price determination  as a markup 
over costs of production.  This refinement  leads to expressing  domestic 
prices excluding  food and oil as a function of separate  price terms for 
nonfood, non-oil  imports  and for oil, among  other  factors. By compari- 
son, much  of the earlier  work  related  total  domestic  prices  to total  import 
prices. Total import prices generally yield a  significant and stable 
coefficient in a domestic price equation, as indicated  in table 7 of the 
paper. Woo's finding  that this effect stems from the effect of oil prices 
on a total  consumption  deflator  is consistent  with  the findings  of a recent 
study  at the Federal  Reserve.2 
Woo finds that a significant  relationship  between nonfood, non-oil 
import  prices  and  domestic  consumer  prices  emerges  when  the domestic 
price equation  is refined  further  by removing  services and automobiles 
(in addition  to food and oil) from  the left-hand-side  variable.  However, 
the coefficient estimate obtained for import prices indicates a much 
smaller impact on total domestic prices than conventional estimates 
suggest. This specification ignores the potentially important  role of 
imports  as inputs  into the excluded sectors. Less than  one-fifth  of U.S. 
imports  can be described  as final  consumer  goods-about  half are raw 
materials  and intermediate  goods and another one-fourth  are capital 
goods. 
The paper  offers an explanation  for the lack of a consistent  empirical 
relationship  between non-oil import  prices and domestic prices. Woo 
suggests that domestic distributors  of imported  goods may have been 
willing to absorb changes in import prices by adjusting  their profit 
2. James E. Glassman,  "The Influence  of Exchange  Rate Movements  on Domestic 
Inflation:  A Reconciliation  of Traditional  Empirical  Estimates"  (Board  of Governors  of 
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margins  in order to stabilize their domestic prices and maintain  their 
market  shares. However, such pricing  behavior  is not consistent with 
the markup  model that is being employed, and a plausible  microfoun- 
dation for this explanation  is not immediately  apparent.  Do we have 
domestic  producers  that are price setters and importers  that  both act as 
price  takers  in  the  domestic  market  and  do not  compete  with  one  another? 
In any event, it is worth  noting  that  the relative  price of non-oil  imports 
fell by more than 20 percent between early 1981  and mid-1983,  which 
would imply a significant  movement  in profit  margins,  particularly  for 
distributorships.  Some corroborative  evidence on this  point  is needed- 
if possible, in the form  of direct  measures  of profit  margins  among  import 
distributors. 
As an alternative explanation, the instability of the non-oil price 
coefficient  across different  specifications  could  reflect  simply  a problem 
with collinearity. The simple correlation  between changes in U.S. oil 
and non-oil  import  prices alone (over Woo's estimation  sample  period) 
is about 0.5. One would hesitate to draw strong  conclusions about the 
results  in the presence of this collinearity. 
Finally, 1 would like to explore the connection  between the prices of 
food and oil imports  and  the exchange  rate, a topic not treated  in Woo's 
analysis. One would  expect the domestic  prices  of goods that  are  traded 
competitively  on world markets  to reflect  changes  in exchange  rates at 
least to some degree. Abstracting  from differences  in price elasticities 
of consumption  and production  across countries, simple comparative 
statics suggest that if the United States and other countries whose 
currencies  are tied to the dollar  account  for, say, half of the total world 
consumption  and production  of a competitively  traded  good, an appre- 
ciation  of the dollar  against  all other  currencies  will result  in a decline  in 
the dollar  price  of the good by half  as much  as the change  in the exchange 
rate. 
This argument  clearly pertains to food commodities. It may also 
pertain to oil, to some extent. It is generally recognized that OPEC 
contract  prices have been significantly  influenced  by competitive spot 
market  prices. The relative  price of OPEC's  oil exports  has declined  by 
roughly  20 percent since early 1981, shortly after the dollar started  to 
appreciate.  As Woo points out, much of the decline probably  reflects 
the recession and lagged response to the earlier oil price increases. 
However, the substantially  higher oil prices facing countries whose Wing T. Woo  535 
currencies  were falling  against  the dollar  must have had some effect on 
their  oil consumption  and  production,  and therefore  on the spot market 
price  of oil, and  ultimately  on U.S. consumer  prices. 
General Discussion 
Several explanations  were offered for the seemingly weak relation 
that  Woo  had  found  between  import  prices  and  the  consumption  deflator. 
Lawrence Klein felt that the single equation  approach  is incapable  of 
giving  a precise estimate.  A more  disaggregated  approach  that  separates 
imports  into consumer  goods, capital  goods and  intermediate  inputs  and 
traces each component through the economy would be theoretically 
more  satisfying.  He argued  that  the purchasing  power  parity  relationship 
ought  to hold in the long run, and the fact that Woo's equations  do not 
yield this,  result indicates they are misspecified. Klein added that the 
official OPEC pricing formula, presently in abeyance, does have an 
exchange  rate in it so that oil prices may need to be treated  as sensitive 
to exchange  rates. 
Richard  Cooper was skeptical about the absence of exchange rate 
effects in the pricing of domestically  produced  goods. So many com- 
plaints  from the steel, textile, and automobile  industries  about  compet- 
itive pressures  from  imports  testify to the contrary.  Furthermore,  many 
countries have conducted their monetary policies with the aim of 
influencing  the value of their exchange  rates because their  experiences 
have suggested that the exchange rate has a powerful effect on their 
price  levels. The present  U.S. quotas  on several  major  import  items are 
a response  to foreign  competition,  indicating  such effects are  potentially 
important  in the United States. However, by keeping  prices above the 
free  trade  level, quotas  effectively eliminate  the impact  of exchange  rate 
movements on domestic prices, helping to produce Woo's results. 
Cooper  also noted that the degree of exchange rate pass-through  may 
depend  importantly  on whether  the exchange  rate  movement  is regarded 
as temporary  or permanent. 
Woo noted that  the United States is the world's  largest  economy and 
that its ratio of trade to GNP is the smallest  in the OECD. This would 
lead  one to expect that the impact  of exchange  rate  movements  is much 
smaller  for the United States than for other countries. He agreed  with 536  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1984 
Cooper  that the protection  provided  by quotas was another  reason for 
such results. 
Stanley Fischer argued that the paper should have considered the 
direct  effects of the exchange rate on wages, and reported  that in work 
with Rudiger Dornbusch, they found that the exchange rate entered 
significantly  into a Phillips  curve specification.  Robert  Gordon  agreed 
that  the exchange rate could logically  enter  into the wage equation,  but 
reported  that in his own work, when he had replaced  the wage variable 
with  its determinants,  the exchange  rate  was significant  only if data  after 
1980  were omitted. In addition,  his price equation  passes the Chow test 
of stability  only if the exchange  rate is excluded. This may indicate  that 
firms' decisions on profit margins  are asymmetrical  to exchange rate 
movements, with behavior different  when the dollar  was depreciating 
from  when  it was appreciating.  Woo  responded  that  some  pressure  could 
come directly from the exchange rate to wages, though  it was hard  to 
investigate  this possibility except through  a Phillips  curve framework. 
And evidence of shifts in the short-run  Phillips curve already had an 
excess of possible explanations. But it was hard  to believe this effect 
was strong  when it did not show up in pressure  on price margins  in his 
equations. 